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URING the Survey period, the Texas appellate courts handed down
numerous decisions construing various rules of civil evidence. Sig-
nificant cases arose under every article of the Texas Rules of Civil
Evidence and in the areas of burden of proof, presumptions, inferences, and
parol evidence. Those cases and this article are organized into the following
substantive topics: (1) Article I - General Provisions; (2) Article II - Ju-
dicial Notice; (3) Burden of Proof, Presumptions, and Inferences; (4) Article
IV - Relevancy and Its Limits; (5) Article V - Privileges; (6) Article VI -
Witnesses; (7) Article VII - Opinions and Expert Testimony; (8) Article
VIII - Hearsay; (9) Article IX - Authentication and Identification; (10)
Article X - Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs; and (11)
Parol Evidence.
I. ARTICLE I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(1) provides that a ruling admitting
evidence cannot be a predicate for a finding of error unless "a timely objec-
tion or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context."' Dur-
ing the Survey period, one court held that a general objection to deposition
excerpts, taken in another court, that was attached to a motion for summary
judgment was insufficient because it did not point out specifically the portion
objected to nor the reasons for the objection.2 Another court held that a
party, who complained on appeal of evidence contained within a psychologi-
cal assessment that had been admitted earlier without objection, had waived
any error regarding a later offer of the same evidence, and had failed to
preserve error by not making a timely objection to the earlier offer under
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(1). 3
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(2) provides that a ruling excluding
evidence cannot be the basis of reversible error unless an offer of proof is
o Linda L. Addison 1991
* J.D. University of Texas. Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 103(a)(1).
2. Dyer v. Shafer, Gilliland, Davis, McCollum & Ashley, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 474, 477
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
3. Posner v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 784 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex. App.-East-
land 1990, writ denied).
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made.4 Accordingly, the parties in one suit failed to preserve error for ap-
pellate review when they did not make an offer of proof after the trial court
excluded their expert's testimony.5 Similarly, the court of appeals refused to
consider whether a court-ordered social study, in a divorce proceeding, was
inadmissible hearsay where the study was not part of the appellate record. 6
II. ARTICLE II - JUDICIAL NOTICE
Article II of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Texas Rules of Civil
Evidence governs judicial notice. Judicially noticed facts must be free of
reasonable dispute7 and either generally known within the trial court's terri-
torial jurisdiction8 or readily determinable by reference to sources the accu-
racy of which could not reasonably be questioned.9 During the Survey
period, the Fifth Circuit took judicial notice that a party had sought transfer
of its bankruptcy proceedings in compliance with a district court's order.1o
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 201(e) is identical to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 201(e).' 1 Both rules provide that a party is entitled to be heard on the
appropriateness of taking judicial notice, and that a request to be heard can
be made after the court has taken judicial notice when there is no prior noti-
fication.' 2 In Chen v. Metropolitan Insurance & Annuity Co. 13 the Fifth Cir-
cuit explained that a party must file a motion requesting an opportunity to
be heard after learning that the court has taken judicial notice in order to
contest the propriety of the court's taking judicial notice. 14
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 201(g) requires the court to instruct the jury
to accept conclusively any fact that has been judicially noticed.' 5 In First
National Bank of Amarillo v. Jarnigan 16 the trial court instructed the jury to
accept thirteen judicially noticed facts as conclusive.' 7 In reversing and re-
manding the case, the Amarillo court of appeals explained that the trial
court erred in judicially noticing that certain legal documents in question
were part of a single transaction because that factual determination should
have been made by the jury.18 The trial court also erred by charging the jury
as to the twelve other judicially noticed facts because the charge amounted
to an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence by the court. 19
4. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 103(a)(2).
5. 784 S.W.2d at 587.
6. Rossen v. Rossen, 792 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1990, no
writ) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 50(d), 74(d) and TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 103(a)(2)).
7. FED. R. EvID. 201(b); TEX. R. Civ. EvlD. 201(b).
8. FED. R. EvID. 201(b)(1); TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 201(b)(1).
9. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2); TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 201(b)(2).
10. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Manges, 900 F.2d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1990).
11. FED. R. EVID. 201(e); TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 201(e).
12. FED. R. EvID. 201(e); TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 201(e).
13. 907 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1990).
14. Id. at 569-70.
15. TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 201(g).
16. 794 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied).
17. Id. at 59-60.
18. Id. at 62.
19. Id. The court reached this decision by construing Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 201(g)
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The court of appeals explained that the judicially noticed facts did not con-
stitute definitions or instructions and hence, were not designed to assist the
jury in answering the questions in the charge.20
Section 38.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits a
court to take judicial notice of an amount representative of typical attorneys
fees in a matter before the court.21 In Gill Savings Association v. Chair King,
Inc. 22 the Houston court of appeals erred by modifying a judgment to delete
$7,800 in attorneys fees for the handling of a bankruptcy matter relating to a
breach of contract claim and $25,000 in attorneys fees for the possible appeal
of the case at issue.23 The court of appeals explained that there was no evi-
dence to support the award and that attorneys fees for bankruptcy proceed-
ings were not recoverable under Section 38.001 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.24 In finding that the court of appeals erred, the Texas
Supreme Court held that attorneys fees for related bankruptcy proceedings
could be awarded in breach of contract actions.25 The supreme court dis-
agreed with the court of appeals' holding that there was no evidence sup-
porting the award of attorneys fees.26 The supreme court held that the trial
court record demonstrated the complexity of the case, and that complexity,
coupled with the trial court's power to take judicial notice of fees, presented
at least some evidence in support of the award of attorneys fees for the ap-
peal.27 Because the court of appeals did not reach the factual sufficiency of
the evidence supporting attorneys fees, and because the trial court was going
to be required to relitigate actual and punitive damages, the supreme court
remanded the issue of attorneys fees to the trial court for redetermination. 28
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 203 governs the determination of laws of
foreign countries. In Ramirez v. Lagunes29 the Corpus Christi court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's denial of a bill of discovery for release of a
Mexican ex-husband's financial records from certain Texas financial institu-
tions because the Mexican ex-wife did not prove that the Mexican courts
in conjunction with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 277. Id. at 61-62. Rule 277 provides, in
part, that:
The court shall submit such instructions and definitions as shall be proper to
enable the jury to render a verdict....
The court shall not in its charge comment directly on the weight of the evi-
dence or advise the jury of the effect of their answers, but the court's charge
shall not be objectionable on the ground that it incidentally constitutes a com-
ment on the weight of the evidence or advises the jury of the effect of their
answers when it is properly a part of an instruction or definition.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
20. 794 S.W.2d at 62.
21. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 (Vernon 1986).
22. 783 S.W.2d 674 (rex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1989), aff'd in part, modified in
part, 797 S.W.2d 31 (rex. 1990).
23. Id. at 681.
24. Id.
25. Gill Saym Ass'n v. Chair King, In., 797 S.W.2d 31, 32 (rex. 1990).
26. Id at 31-32.
27. Id. at 32.
28. Id.
29. 794 S.W.2d 501 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
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were unable to grant comparable discovery relief.30
III. BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND INFERENCES
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses presumptions. Be-
cause the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence lack a corresponding article III,
Texas common law continues to govern the law of presumptions. During
the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court further developed the law of
presumptions, burden of proof, and inferences in Texas.
In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Lindsay3 the Texas Supreme Court held
there is no presumption that a default judgment or summary judgment dis-
poses of all parties and issues before a trial court. Lindsay was a mandamus
proceeding arising out of a deficiency action following a foreclosure and sale
of mortgaged property.32 A prior judge had granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the deficiency claim. 33 Judge Lindsay then held
that the order disposed of all parties and issues and that the trial court no
longer had plenary jurisdiction. 34 On motion for rehearing, the supreme
court held the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, which did not mention the defendant's counterclaims, was
interlocutory, and did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction as to the
pending counterclaims, even if the counterclaims were not severable.35
In Christiansen v. Prezelski 36 the Texas Supreme Court reiterated the well
established principle that the burden is on the appellant to present a suffi-
cient record on appeal to show reversible error.37 The appellant, Prezelski,
requested that only a portion of the record from the trial court be sent to the
court of appeals. Additionally, the appellant failed to comply with the re-
quirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53(d), resulting in a loss of
the rule's presumption that omitted portions of the record were irrelevant to
the appeal. Without a complete trial record, and without the Rule 53(d)
presumption, the supreme court held that the court of appeals could not
determine whether the alleged trial court error was harmful.38 In Acker v.
Texas Water Commission 39 the Texas Supreme Court also reiterated the
principle that on motion for summary judgment, evidence supportive of the
non-movant will be presumed as true, with all reasonable inferences in-
dulged in the non-movant's favor and any doubts resolved to its advantage. 4°
30. Id. at 506.
31. 787 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1990) (original proceeding).
32. Id. at 52.
33. Id.; id. at 52 n. 1.
34. Id.
35. Id at 53.
36. 782 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1990).
37. Id. at 843 (citing Tex. R. App. P. 50(d), 53(d)).
38. Id.
39. 790 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1990).
40. Id. at 301-02.
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IV. RELEVANCY AND Irs LiMars
Article IV of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs relevancy and its
limits.4 1 All relevant evidence may be admitted unless some constitutional
provision, statute, or other rule provides otherwise. 42 Evidence that is not
relevant is not admissible.43
In a products liability suit against Volkswagen, the Corpus Christi court
of appeals held that the trial court properly admitted evidence of a barroom
brawl." The evidence in question showed that one of the drivers involved in
a fatal two car collision had been in an altercation at a tavern just before the
accident, and had been warned the police had been called.45 The court of
appeals reasoned that the evidence was relevant and admissible, and sup-
portive of Volkswagen's defense that the vehicles collided at a very high clos-
ing speed since it tended to show a motive and state of mind on the part of
the one driver for traveling at a high rate of speed.46
In a suit by a customer against a pest exterminator, the customer alleged
that she had suffered mental anguish as a result of a chlordane application to
her home.47 The Austin court of appeals held that the district court prop-
erly admitted psychiatric evidence concerning the customer's teenage son's
anger, discouragement, and emotional distress following the pesticide treat-
ment.48 The evidence of the son's emotional problems supported the cus-
tomer's claim for damages because evidence presented showed the son's
problems had in turn caused the customer mental anguish.49
In Montelongo v. Goodall50 the Austin court of appeals upheld the trial
court's exclusion of certain evidence as irrelevant. The suit involved a ten-
ant's claim against the landlord for injuries suffered by the tenant allegedly
due to defective trailer house steps. 5 1 The tenant sought to admit testimony
that the steps did not comply with municipal building code standards. 52 The
court of appeals held that the proffered testimony was irrelevant and prop-
erly excluded because the tenant did not introduce evidence to show that the
building code standards applied to the steps in question. 53
In Roberts v. Harnischfeger Corp. 54 a products liability action, the Fifth
Circuit held that evidence of subsequent safety improvements was irrelevant
to the determination of whether the crane in question was unreasonably dan-
41. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. art. IV.
42. TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 402. For the definition of relevance, see Id. 401.
43. Id. 402.
44. Ramirez v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 700, 704-05 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied).
45. Id
46. Id.




50. 788 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
51. Id at 720.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 901 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1989).
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gerous when manufactured. The plaintiff had shown that the manufacturer
offered a shut-off type safety device that may have prevented plaintiff's in-
jury as optional equipment on the 1978 model of crane in question. 5 The
plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to introduce evidence, deemed irrelevant, that
the manufacturer included a warning-type safety device, developed after
1978, as standard equipment on its 1984 cranes to show that the 1978 crane
was unreasonably dangerous when sold because it did not include the shut-
off safety device as standard equipment.5 6
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 403 allows the exclusion of relevant evidence
on special grounds such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or if the
evidence is merely cumulative.5 7 The exclusion under Rule 403 is discre-
tionary.58 In a suit for breach of an option contract, the trial court properly
excluded, under Rule 403, a letter from an option grantors' attorney to the
option holder's attorney that dealt primarily with the grantor's legal opinion
of the validity of the contract. 59 In another suit, the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, as receiver for a savings institution, was
granted a new trial on breach of contract claims against it when the trial
court had improperly admitted fraud claims that were barred under the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine because the admission of evidence on the fraud
claims may have resulted in unfair prejudice on the contract claims.6°
The mere fact that testimony is adverse to a party does not warrant its
exclusion under Rule 403 as demonstrated by Davidson Oil Country Supply
Co. v. Klockner, Inc.61 In Klockner, a breach of warranty of merchantability
action against the distributor of well tubing, the trial court improperly ex-
cluded evidence of other similar failures of the Italian manufactured tubing
because it would have shown a latent defect. 62 Similarly, a district court
correctly admitted evidence that the driver of a vehicle involved in a fatal
accident had been in a barroom fight shortly before the accident and that he
had been warned that the police had been called.63 The evidence, although
adverse to a party, was relevant to show the driver's motive and state of
mind for allegedly maintaining a high rate of speed. 64
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 408 excludes evidence of compromise and
offers to compromise when offered to prove liability, or the invalidity of a
claim or its amount.65 During the Survey period, the Beaumont court of
appeals held that Rule 408 is inapplicable to completed agreements for com-
55. Id. at 44.
56. Id.
57. TEx. R. Civ. EviD. 403.
58. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if .... " Id. (emphasis added).
59. Olson v. Bayland Publishing, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist
Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
60. Federal Says. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. T. F. Stone-Liberty Land Assocs., 787 S.W.2d 475,
493-94 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ granted).
61. 908 F.2d 1238, aff'd on rehearing, 917 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1990).
62. Id. at 1244-46.
63. Ramirez v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 700, 704-05 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied).
64. Id.
65. TEx. R. Civ. EviD. 408.
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promise.66 Explaining that the settlement agreement at issue resulted in an
accord and satisfaction that would have been enforceable by the appellant,
the Beaumont court rejected appellant's argument that the agreement was
not competent summary judgment evidence because it was not admissible
under Rule 408.67 In Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Carter6s a
worker's suit against a railroad, the Texarkana court of appeals held that a
trial court should have excluded an affidavit regarding the railroad's settle-
ment of an unrelated lawsuit as evidence in a hearing on the railroad's mo-
tion to transfer venue. The worker argued that the settlement was offered
not to show the railroad's liability in the prior suit, but only that the railroad
owned and operated the train involved in the prior suit.69 In rejecting this
argument, the Texarkana court reasoned that ownership and operation of
the train were essential to determination of the railroad's liability in the prior
suit; therefore, the settlement agreement could not be used to show owner-
ship and operation.70
Rule 408, however, does not require exclusion of settlement evidence
when offered for some other purpose, such as showing the bias or prejudice
of a witness or party.71 In Ochs v. Martinez72 the San Antonio court of
appeals approved the trial court's exclusion of statements allegedly made by
a father during settlement negotiations in a custody dispute that he would
consent to his ex-wife's custody of one daughter if he was allowed custody of
the other.73 The court rejected the appellant's argument that the statements
were admissible to show bias or prejudice under the Rule 408 exception. 74
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 410 excludes evidence of pleas, plea discus-
sions, and related statements. 75 In Cedillo v. Payloff'6 the appellant's attor-
ney had objected on relevancy grounds to the admission of appellant's nolo
contendre plea. Since the objection had not been directed to the prohibitions
of Rule 410, the Fort Worth court of appeals held that the error in admitting
the plea had was not preserved for appeal.77
V. PRIVILEGES
Article V of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs privileges. No
person has a privilege to refuse disclosure of any matter,78 unless rules of
66. Tag Resources, Inc. v. Petroleum Well Servs., Inc., 791 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1990, no writ).
67. Id.
68. 778 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. TEX. R. CIv. EviD. 408.
72. 789 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
73. Id. at 959-60.
74. it
75. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 410.
76. 792 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
77. Id. at 833.
78. TEX. R. Cv. EvID. 501(2).
1991]
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evidence recognize the privilege, 79 or a statute80 or constitutionl grants the
privilege. Some of the specific privileges provided for in the Texas Rules of
Civil Evidence include: (1) lawyer-client privilege;8 2 (2) husband-wife com-
munication privilege; 3 (3) communications to clergymen;84 (4) trade
secrets;8 5 and (5) physician-patient privilege.86
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 502 makes privileged reports that are re-
quired by law.87 During the Survey period, the Fort Worth court of appeals
rejected a newspaper's argument that handwritten notes prepared by an at-
torney working for the corporate parent of the newspaper were privileged
from discovery in a sexual harassment lawsuit in Star-Telegram, Inc. v.
Schattman.88 In denying the writ of mandamus, the Fort Worth court of
appeals explained that although Title VII required the newspaper to investi-
gate sexual harassment claims, neither Title VII nor the EEOC sexual har-
assment guidelines89 required reports; therefore the Rule 502 privilege for
reports required by law did not apply.90
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503 codifies the common law lawyer-client
privilege. 91 Additionally, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166(b)(3) provides
a post-accident investigative privilege when a suit has already been initiated,
or when there is good cause to believe suit will be filed.92 In Boring & Tun-
neling Co. of America v. Salazar93 the Houston court of appeals considered
both the lawyer-client and post-accident investigative privileges. The court
rejected the asserted privileges on three documents because the evidence did
not demonstrate that the post-accident investigative privileges were applica-
ble or that the attorney-client relationship had been created when the in-
sured's employee gave a statement to the insured's attorney.94 The court,
however, held that the attorney-client privilege did apply to an attorney's
letter to an insurance adjuster who had hired him.95
79. See id. 502-10.
80. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h (Vernon Supp. 1990), repealed by TEx. R.
Civ. EVID. 510 (effective Sept. 1, 1983, as to civil cases) and TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 510 (effec-
tive Sept. 1, 1986, as to criminal cases) (confidential communications between physician and
patient relating to professional services rendered by physician for mental health purposes are
privileged).
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.






88. 784 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 1990) (original proceeding; leave
denied).
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1989).
90. 784 S.W.2d at 1 11.
91. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 503.
92. Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (Tex. 1989) (original proceeding); Stringer
v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. 1986) (original proceeding);
Turbodyne Corp. v. Heard, 720 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1986) (original proceeding).
93. 782 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989) (original proceeding).
94. Id. at 286-89.
95. Id. at 289-90.
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A client may waive protection of a privilege by allegations and legal pro-
ceedings.96 For example, Parten v. Brigham 97 involved a wife's petition for
writ of mandamus from a bill of review proceeding to set aside a divorce
decree because of alleged concealment of community assets by the husband.
The wife sought to compel the trial court to vacate its order requiring pro-
duction of her divorce attorney's entire case file. 98 The court of appeals con-
ditionally granted the writ but limited it to the parts of the court's order
allowing discovery in the matters not dealing with the wife's and her law-
yer's knowledge of the community estate.99 For the remainder, the court
found the wife's assertion of the attorney-client privilege to be a prohibited
offensive use of the privilege, where the information sought by the husband
regarding her knowledge of the assets in question was crucial in determining
whether the divorce decree was entered without the wife's fault or
negligence. 10
By contrast, the Waco court of appeals conditionally granted a writ of
mandamus to vacate a trial court's order compelling a party to produce cer-
tain documents he claimed were protected from the attorney-client privilege
in Cantrell v. Johnson. 10 The Waco court of appeals held that the attorney-
client privilege was not waived regarding attorney-client communications
during negotiation of a stock option agreement by the client's subsequent
filing of a fraud action against other parties to the agreement even though a
contested issue in that action was the client's knowledge and state of mind
when he entered into the agreement.' 0 2 The Waco court of appeals ex-
plained that the trial court had not expressly found that the documents in
question were relevant to the issues in the case, and additionally, the trial
court had specifically found the attorney-client privilege had not been
waived. 103
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 509 contains the physician-patient privi-
lege. 104 Exceptions to nondisclosure under the physician-patient privilege
exist where any party relies upon a physical, mental, or emotional condition
as part of his claim or defense. 105 In Scheffey v. Chambers 10 6 the Houston
court of appeals held that hospital medical records of a physician, who fol-
lowing his arrest for cocaine possession admitted himself to the hospital,
were privileged in a medical malpractice lawsuit against the physician for
96. Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tex. 1985) (original
proceeding); Dewitt & Rearick, Inc. v. Ferguson, 699 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1985) (original proceeding).
97. 785 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989) (original proceeding).
98. Id. at 166.
99. Id. at 169.
100. Id. at 167-68.
101. 785 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990) (original proceeding).
102. Id at 189.
103. 785 S.W.2d at 189.
104. TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 509.
105. Id. 509(d)(4), 510(d)(5).




surgeries he had performed prior to his arrest.107 The court explained that
the exceptions in Rules 509(d)(4) and 5 10(d)(5) only prohibit offensive use of
the privilege in situations such as when a party attempts to conceal evidence
of his physical or mental condition after he has placed his condition in is-
sue. 10 8 In Midkiff v. Shaver109 the Amarillo court of appeals held that an
insured did not place her mental condition in issue when she sought damages
for ordinary mental anguish, for which she had received medical attention,
as part of a lawsuit against her insurer for the mishandling of her insurance
claim allegedly in violation of state law and the insurer's duty of good faith
and fair dealing."10 The Amarillo court, however, further held that the in-
sured could not use her evidentiary privileges to prevent discovery of the
medical and mental health records concerning her alleged emotional condi-
tion and neither could she refuse to answer deposition questions concerning
the medical attention she received that pertained to her mental anguish
claim. I 1'
Under the Texas Medical Practice Act 1 2 records and reports received,
maintained, or developed by the Board of Medical Examiners are not subject
to discovery in a medical malpractice suit. 1 13 In Brochner v. Thomas 114 the
Eastland court of appeals held that a doctor's statement to the Board of
Medical Examiners, another doctor's report to the Board (a copy of which
was also sent to an insurance company), reports by Board investigators, and
a memo discussing phone calls between the Board and the doctor's partner
were privileged and not discoverable. In response to an argument that the
sending of the report to the insurance company had waived the privilege, the
Eastland court explained that the privilege accorded records maintained by
the Board of Medical Examiners belonged to the Board and could not be
waived by other parties." 5
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 510 provides for the confidentiality of
mental health information. In Kentucky Fried Chicken National Manage-
ment v. Tennant 116 the Houston court of appeals conditionally granted a
writ of mandamus giving relief from a trial court's discovery order denying
access to plaintiff's psychiatric records. 117 The court explained that the psy-
chiatric records were discoverable, as opposed to admissible, unless the
plaintiffs could show the records would not be materially probative on the
107. Id. at 881.
108. Id.; see Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tex. 1985) (orig-
inal proceeding); Dewitt & Rearick, Inc. v. Ferguson, 699 S.W.2d 692, 694 (rex. App.-El
Paso 1985) (original proceeding).
109. 788 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990) (original proceeding).
110. Id. at 402.
111. Id. at 402-03.
112. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (Vernon 1990).
113. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b § 5.06(s)(3) (Vernon 1990).
114. 795 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990) (original proceeding; leave
denied).
115. Id.
116. 782 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. App.-Houston [List Dist.] 1989) (original proceeding).
117. Id. at 319.
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issue of the validity of KFC's asserted defense. 118 By alleging a connection
between the psychiatric histories of the plaintiffs and their claims for dam-
ages, KFC had made the records relevant for its defense.' 19 "The burden
[then] shifted to the plaintiffs to plead and prove [that] the records were not
relevant."' 120 The Houston court of appeals distinguished this case from
Coates v. Whittington,12 1 in which the Texas Supreme Court held that rou-
tine allegations of mental anguish in personal injury actions do not put the
plaintiff's mental condition in controversy, and that the defendant, in order
to obtain discovery of the plaintiff's psychiatric history, needed to show a
nexus between that history and plaintiff's claims of damages.' 22 The Hous-
ton court of appeals suggested that the Tennant plaintiffs might have demon-
strated the records neither proved nor disproved the validity of KFC's
defenses, and were therefore irrelevant, by producing the records in
camera.
123
VI. ARTICLE VI - WITNEssEs
Texas courts consider the dead man's statute' 24 repealed as to civil ac-
tions by Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 601(b). Rule 601(b) applies only to
uncorroborated oral statements by a decedent or a ward "[i]n actions by or
against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judgment may be
rendered for or against them as such .... ,1 25 Rule 601(b) extends to actions
by or against the decedent's heirs or legal representatives that are based in
some measure on such uncorroborated oral statements. 26 Rule 601(b) is
much more liberal than its predecessor which prohibited testimony regard-
ing transactions with, or statements by, a decedent or ward. 27 Rule 601(b)
does not exclude evidence of transactions; it only excludes testimony as to
any oral statement by a testator, intestate, or ward if the testimony to the
oral statement is not corroborated. 128
The San Antonio court of appeals interpreted the corroboration require-
ment of Rule 601(b) in Powers v. McDaniel.'29 Powers was a mother's action
against the executor of her son's estate seeking to recover a one-half interest
118. Id. at 321.
119. Id
120. Id.
121. 758 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1988) (original proceeding).
122. Id at 752.
123. 782 S.W.2d at 321.
124. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926), repealed by TEx. R. Civ. EvID.
601(b) (effective Sept. 1, 1983).
125. TEX. R. Cv. EwyD. 601(b).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 601(b). Like its predecessor, article 3716, this rule can be waived
if the "witness is called at the trial to testify thereto by the opposite party." Id. (emphasis
added). "At the trial" was added in the amendment to the rule effective November 1, 1984.
Unlike its predecessor, the rule will not be waived by question to the opposite party during
discovery.
129. 785 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
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in a house located in Boerne, Texas. 130 Powers testified that she and her son
had entered into an oral agreement whereby he agreed to will his half inter-
est in the house back to her.' 3 ' She produced copies of personal checks
drawn on her account for the purchase of the property. 132 Additionally, the
mother introduced a copy of her son's original will, executed one month
after the oral statement, which would have devised his one-half interest in
the house to her as agreed. 33 The San Antonio court found the actions of
the son in carrying out the promises of the prior oral agreement to be ade-
quate corroboration for Rule 601(b). 134
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 606(b) governs jury misconduct. 135 Upon
inquiry into a verdict's validity, a juror may testify regarding only whether
an influence outside the courtroom was improperly brought against a ju-
ror.' 36 In Soliz v. Saenz137 the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that
comments by jurors during deliberations regarding their personal exper-
iences did not constitute an "outside influence" upon the jury.138 The court
explained that for information not in evidence to be an "outside influence,"
the information must come from someone outside the jury who introduces
the information to the jury to affect its verdict. 139
VII. ARTICLE VII - OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 701 permits lay witnesses to offer rationally
based opinions that help the trier of fact to either understand the witness's
testimony better or to determine a fact in issue.140 Rule 701 has greatly
liberalized the admission of lay witnesses' opinion testimony.' 4' Texas evi-
dence law has always been liberal in allowing an owner of property to offer
his opinion of the property's value.' 42 A property owner can give opinion
testimony even though he would not be qualified as an expert regarding the
value of the same property if owned by another person. 143 During the Sur-
vey period, one court admitted the testimony of an automobile owner re-
garding the value of the automobile in her conversion action against a bank
after the automobile, which had been pledged as collateral for a loan, was
130. Id. at 916-17.




135. TEx. R. CIv. EVID. 606(b).
136. Id.
137. 779 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
138. IM. at 932.
139. Id.
140. TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 701.
141. Id.
142. See Classified Parking Sys. v. Kirby, 507 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston





taken by the bank and sold without her permission. 144 In a divorce action,
another court permitted a wife to testify concerning the value of her hus-
band's trucking business because she had participated in running the busi-
ness for five years, she was familiar with the purchase price for each of the
trucks, and she was knowledgeable of the value of similar businesses that
were for sale. 145
B. Testimony by Experts
1. Competency of Expert
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 702 permits expert opinion testimony from a
witness who qualifies as an expert by reason of specialized training, educa-
tion, or so forth.146 In Trailways, Inc. v. Clark 147 a supervisor for the Mexi-
can federal police who was trained in accident reconstruction was permitted
to testify in a wrongful death action as an expert regarding the speed of a bus
and its contribution to the cause of the accident.1 48 The Corpus Christi
court of appeals explained that the determination of whether a witness is
qualified to testify as an expert is within the discretion of the trial court, and
that a witness may testify as an accident analyst and reconstruction expert if
it is shown that he is trained in the particular science on which his testimony
is based. 149
2. Bases of Opinion Testimony
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 703 outlines the proper bases of expert opin-
ion testimony.150 An expert may base her opinion on any facts or data,
whether admissible or not, that other experts in the relevant field would rea-
sonably rely on in forming opinions. 151 In Welder v. Welder152 the Corpus
Christi court of appeals approved testimony from the husband's accountant
in a divorce proceeding as to the separate or community nature of various
assets.153 The accountant based his testimony on summary schedules that
traced community and separate interests and expenditures through a joint
account. 154 Although holding that the summaries were admissible, the
court in dicta noted that even if the summaries were inadmissible hearsay,
the accountant's testimony would still be permitted under Rule 703, because
the trial court could have reasonably found the summary accounting records
to be the type of information on which accounting experts reasonably
144. First Nat'l Bank v. Gittelman, 788 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1990, writ denied).
145. Laprade v. Laprade, 784 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ
denied).
146. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 702
147. 794 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
148. Id. at 482-83.
149. Id. at 483.
150. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 703.
151. Id.
152. 794 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).





Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 703 closely parallels Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 703.156 In Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp. 157 the Fifth Circuit
held that challenges to the bases and sources of an expert's opinion generally
go to the weight to be given to the opinion, not to its admissibility.' 58 The
court explained that expert opinions should be excluded, based on their ba-
ses and sources, only if they are "fundamentally unsupported" such that
they would not assist the trier of fact in reaching a proper, intelligent
verdict. 159
C. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 704 provides that an expert may testify on
ultimate issues that are to be determined by the trier of fact.160 In Metot v.
Danielson 161 the Tyler court of appeals reversed the judgment of a trial
court that erred by excluding testimony from one of plaintiffs' experts re-
garding the ultimate issues of negligence and proximate cause.' 62 At trial,
plaintiffs attempted to read deposition testimony into evidence wherein they
asked their medical expert to assume definitions of negligence and proximate
cause, and then asked for his opinion as to whether defendant's conduct was
negligent and a proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiff. 63 In reversing
and remanding the case for a new trial, the court of appeals explained that
under Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital 164 expert opinion on ulti-
mate issues must be limited to relevant issues and correct legal concepts. 165
The Tyler court found that the excluded testimony was relevant, and be-
cause the medical expert was asked to use correct legal definitions of negli-
gence and proximate cause, the court found the testimony to have been
based on proper legal concepts.166
VIII. ARTICLE VIII - HEARSAY
A. Identifying Hearsay
Whether a statement is hearsay is often difficult to determine.' 67 Two
155. Id.
156. The Texas rule and federal rules were identical prior to a minor amendment to the
Texas rule that became effective September 1, 1990.
157. 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted en banc, 914 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1990).
158. Id. at 364-65.
159. Id. (quoting Viterba v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)).
160. TEX. R. Civ. EvD. 704.
161. 780 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, writ denied).
162. Id. at 288.
163. Id.
164. 747 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1987).
165. 780 S.W.2d at 288.
166. Id.
167. Texas Rules of Civil Evidence 801 to 806 comprehensively define the hearsay rule and
its exceptions. Additionally, "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is intro-




appellate courts during the Survey period considered whether proffered evi-
dence was hearsay. In the medical malpractice action of Krueger v. Go1168
the Houston court of appeals held that a statement from a physician to the
plaintiff, which was contained in plaintiff's affidavit opposing summary judg-
ment based on a limitations defense, was not hearsay because it was not
offered to prove the diagnosis asserted in the statement but rather, to show
the date plaintiff was notified of her potential malpractice claim.169 In
Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams 170 the Fifth Circuit held a series of
notations that documented an alleged telephone conversation were inadmis-
sible hearsay since they were offered for proof of the matter asserted in them
- the content of the telephone conversation.171 The Fifth Circuit acknowl-
edged, however, that the notes could be admitted for another purpose, such
as to show that the conversation occurred.172
B. Statements That Are Not Hearsay
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 801(e) excludes from the definition of hear-
say prior statements by a witness, 173 admissions by a party opponent,1 74 and
depositions.175
1. Prior Statements by a Witness
"A statement is not hearsay if - (i) the declarant testifies and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) incon-
sistent with his testimony, and was given under oath... , or (B) consistent
with his testimony and is offered to rebut [a charge] of recent fabrication
....1 76 In Ochs v. Martinez177 the San Antonio court of appeals rejected
an argument that testimony was not hearsay where the testimony dealt with
statements by a daughter to her father and others alleging sexual abuse by
her stepfather.' 78 In reversing and remanding the case, the San Antonio
court explained that Rule 801(e)(1)(B), which admits prior consistent state-
ments to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, is applicable only when the
declarant testifies at trial and can be cross-examined concerning the state-
ment. 179 Because the declarant did not testify and was not subject to cross-
examination, the San Antonio court of appeals held that Rule 801(e)(1)(B)
did not apply. 180
168. 787 S.W.2d 138 (rex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
169. Id. at 141.
170. 897 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990).
171. Id. at 192.
172. Id.




177. 789 S.W.2d 949 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).





C. The Hearsay Rule
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 802 is the general rule of exclusion for hear-
say. 1' 1 Rule 802 also provides, however, that when hearsay is admitted
without objection, the hearsay cannot be denied probative value merely be-
cause of its status as hearsay.' 8 2 During the Survey period, three Texas
courts followed the Rule and held that when hearsay evidence was admitted
without objection, it would not be denied probative value. 18 3
D. Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immaterial
L Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(3) admits statements of the declarant's
then existing state of mind, or emotional or physical condition as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. 184 Two courts during the Survey period reached
opposite conclusions about whether similar evidence was an excited utter-
ance under Rule 803(3). In Ochs Y. Martinez 185 the San Antonio court of
appeals held that testimony regarding statements by a daughter to her father
and others alleging past acts of sexual abuse by her stepfather was not ad-
missible under Rule 803(3). The court explained that the hearsay exception
normally only admitted spontaneous remarks about some sensation made
while the declarant was experiencing the sensation, and could not be used to
admit statements of past external facts or conditions.' 86 In Posner v. Dallas
County Child Welfare Unit,'87 a suit to terminate parental rights, the East-
land court of appeals held that the daughter's statement "[g]ive me your
doll, and I will show you with mine how daddies sex their little girls," was
within the Rule 803(3) hearsay exception as evidence of the daughter's then
existing mental and emotional condition. 88
2. Business Records
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(6) governs the introduction of records of
regularly conducted activities, commonly known as business records.' 8 9
Rule 803(6) requires that the records, to qualify for the exception, be kept in
conjunction with a regularly conducted business activity by a person with
181. TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 802.
182. Id.
183. City of Bridge City v. State ex rel. City of Port Arthur, 792 S.W.2d 217, 234 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1990, writ denied) (exhibits admitted without objection); El Paso Assocs. v.
J. R. Thurman & Co., 786 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ) (affidavit, ulti-
mately based on hearsay became admissible, competent summary judgment evidence absent
written objection); Director, State Employees Workers' Compensation Div. v. Dominguez, 786
S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ) (medical bill was properly admitted even
though possible hearsay when testimony about the bill had already been admitted without
objection).
184. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(3).
185. 789 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
186. Id. at 959.
187. 784 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ denied).
188. Id. at 587.
189. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 803(6).
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knowledge of the recorded information and as a regular practice of the busi-
ness.190 Live witness testimony is not required to demonstrate the document
is a business record, and records may be authenticated by an affidavit that
complies with Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 902(10).191 During the Survey
period, the El Paso court of appeals held that portions of a report, prepared
by a physician who had examined a personal injury plaintiff, were not admis-
sible under Rule 803(6) where the portions excluded contained summaries of
notes and reports prepared by other physicians.192
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) is substantially similar to Texas Rule of
Civil Evidence 803(6). During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit held that
the business records exception could not be used to admit the statement of a
witness to plaintiff's accident on an offshore platform that was taken by a
barge captain on his own initiative. 193 The circuit found the proponent
failed to show that the document was prepared or kept in the regular prac-
tice of the business. 194
3. Public Records and Reports and Hearsay Within Hearsay
Certain reports of public offices or agencies are admissible as exceptions to
the hearsay rule under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(8).195 Moreover,
hearsay within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if all parts of
the proffered statement fit into some exception to the hearsay rule. 196 In All
Saints Hospital v. MS. 197 the Fort Worth court of appeals held that the trial
court had committed prejudicial error by allowing into evidence portions of
a social worker's investigation of a claim that an employee of a day-care
center had sexually abused one of the children. 198 The portions in question
recounted conversations between the social worker, other parents, and other
children, and were, therefore, multiple hearsay. 199 The multiple hearsay
portions did not fit within any exception to the hearsay rule, and thus were
inadmissible, even though the report itself was admissible under Rule 803(8)
as a public record.2°°
4. Statement Against Interest
A statement that at the time of its making is so contrary to the declarant's
interests that a reasonable person would not have made the statement unless
he believed it to be true is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule
190. IdL
191. Id. Rule 902(10) permits the introduction of business records accompanied by an affi-
davit that conforms to the requirements set forth in that Rule. Id. 902(10).
192. Hooper v. Torres, 790 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
193. Wilander v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 887 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110
S. Ct. 3212 (1990).
194. Id
195. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 803(8).
196. TEx. R. CIv. EVID. 805.
197. 791 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
198. Id. at 323.
199. Id at 322-23.
200. Id. at 323.
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under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(24).201 In State v. Arnold,202 an
automobile forfeiture action under the Controlled Substances Act, the Texas
Supreme Court held that hearsay testimony that the respondent's brother-in-
law stated the automobile at issue was registered in the respondent's name
merely to avoid forfeiture, and that the brother-in-law was the true owner of
the automobile, was admissible as a statement against interest.203 The court
explained that these statements, made in the context of potential forfeiture,
were not overly self-serving, and were sufficiently trustworthy to be proba-
tive on the issue of ownership. 2°4
E. Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) is a residual hearsay exception for un-
available declarants. 20 5 The Texas Rules of Civil Evidence contain no simi-
lar provision. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) provides for the admission
of statements of an unavailable declarant not covered by the other excep-
tions contained in Rule 804, but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness if the court makes certain threshold determinations re-
quired for admissibility. 20 6 In King v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. 20 7
the Fifth Circuit approved the admission of deposition testimony from a
prior unrelated action of a scientist, who at the time of the deposition was
employed by a company that mined raw asbestos.208 The deposition was
admissible under the residual hearsay exception in the subsequent action
against a manufacturer of asbestos-containing products after the death of the
scientist.209 The Fifth Circuit explained that the deposition was probative of
a material fact at issue in the case, namely, the state of scientific knowledge
before plaintiff's exposure, which the defendant as a manufacturer should
have been aware of, concerning the risks and dangers of asbestos.210
IX. ARTICLE IX - AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Texas Rule of Civil of Civil Evidence 901 requires authentication or iden-
tification of evidence as a condition precedent to admitting the offered evi-
dence. 211 The authentication requirement is satisfied by evidence that is
sufficient to show that the matter in question is what its proponent alleges.2 12
During the Survey period, the Corpus Christi court of appeals reversed a
summary judgment because unauthenticated copies of deposition excerpts
201. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 803(24).
202. 778 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1989).
203. Id. at 69-70.
204. Id. at 70.
205. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
206. Id.
207. 906 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1990).
208. Id. at 1025-26.
209. Id. at 1026.
210. Id.




could not be used to support an entry of judgment. 213
X. ARTICLE X - CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS,
AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Article X of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs the admission of
the contents of writings, recordings, and photographs. 214 Texas Rule of
Civil Evidence 1006 provides that the otherwise admissible contents of volu-
minous writings that would be inconvenient to examine in court may be
offered in summary form.215 In Welder v. Welder 216 the Corpus Christi
court of appeals held admissible a summary schedule, prepared by the hus-
band's accountants in a divorce proceeding, tracing community and separate
income and expenditures through a joint account to the ultimate purchase of
various assets in dispute.217 The court explained that the summary was ad-
missible under Rule 1006 because testimony had shown that the underlying
business records were voluminous, that they were admissible themselves as
business records, and that they had been made available to the wife.218
XI. PAROL EVIDENCE
The parol evidence rule proscribes the use of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret a writing in some circumstances. 219 A court may allow extrinsic evi-
dence if it finds a contract to be ambiguous.220 The rule prohibits parol
evidence concerning the terms in a contract if the contract is integrated.221
Several courts during the Survey period excluded parol evidence to interpret
unambiguous written contracts.222 Although fraud in the inducement is an
exception to the parol evidence rule, one court excluded evidence of fraud
where the proponent of extrinsic evidence did not make the required show-
ing of trickery, or deceptive scheme.223
The Texas Supreme Court held parol evidence admissible for purposes of
showing mutual mistake of fact in a release, despite the scope of the lan-
guage in a release.224 In an insured's case against an insurer, the San
Antonio court of appeals held parol evidence admissible to explain an ambi-
213. Kotzur v. Kelly, 791 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
214. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. art. X.
215. TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 1006.
216. 794 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
217. Id at 428-30.
218. Id. at 429.
219. 2 R. RAY, TEXAS PRACricE § 1601 (3d ed. 1980).
220. See Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 732 (rex. 1981) (construction of unam-
biguous oil and gas lease).
221. Integration is the practice of embodying a transaction into a final written agreement
"intended to incorporate in its terms the entire transaction." R. RAY, supra note 219, at
§ 1602.
222. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Responsive Terminal Sys., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 738, 745 (rex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ granted); C & C Partners v. Sun Expl. & Prod. Co., 783 S.W.2d 707,
714 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
223. Cocke v. Meridian Says. Ass'n, 778 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1989, no writ).
224. Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (rex. 1990).
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guity as to why an insurance premium was divided into two amounts. 225
The Corpus Christi court of appeals held that parol evidence was admissible
to show the amount of an initial advance that was to have been used to
discharge tax liens on property where the written agreement between the
parties was incomplete regarding the amount.226
225. Balderama v. Western Casualty Life Ins. Co., 794 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1990, writ granted).
226. First Victoria Nat'l Bank v. Briones, 788 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied).
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